



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FM SECRETARY OF STATE
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMCONEL MARRAS
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DHAKA
AMEMBASSY ISLAHABAD
AMEMBASSY JIBRA
AMEMBASSY KADUN
AMCONEL KARACHI
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
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REVIEWED by Ryan DATE 9/11/87
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STADIS: //////////////////////////////////////
E.O. 12861: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AF, UR, UN, PK, PREL, PINS
SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN NEGOTIATIONS: GENESIS AND
PROSPECTS

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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1. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF A RECENTLY PUBLISHED INR ASSESSMENTS AND RESEARCH INTELLIGENCE REPORT DRAFTED BY JEFFREY LUNSTEAD, INR/NEGA. THE FULL REPORT WILL BE SENT TO YOU BY POUCH.

2. DIEGO CORDOVEZ, THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN, WILL VISIT TEHRAN, KABUL, AND ISLAMABAD IN MID-JANUARY FOR A FOURTH ROUND OF UN SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY ON THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS. HIS MEDIATION EFFORT IS THE LATEST OF A WIDE RANGE OF INITIATIVES THAT BEGAN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SOVIETS INVADED AFGHANISTAN THREE YEARS AGO. SO FAR IT HAS BEEN THE ONLY ONE IN WHICH BOTH THE SOVIETS AND PAKISTANIS HAVE AGREED TO PARTICIPATE.

3. MOSCOW'S INCREASING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR CORDOVEZ' MISSION, THE GREATER SOVIET EMPHASIS IN RECENT MONTHS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION, AND SOME SIGNS OF PAKISTANI FLEXIBILITY REGARDING SOVIET INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THE NATURE OF AN ACCEPTABLE FUTURE REGIME IN KABUL HAVE KINDLED HOPES THAT A SOLUTION MIGHT BE FOUND. IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT MOSCOW AND ISLAMABAD HAVE FOUND THE TALKS TO BE USEFUL.

4. IT IS DOUBTFUL, HOWEVER, THAT THE PARTIES WILL AGREE TO A DRAFT SETTLEMENT IN JANUARY. EVEN IF THEY SHOULD AGREE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF A SETTLEMENT, KABUL WILL ALMOST SURELY INSIST THAT THEY MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO DIRECT TALKS. THIS IN ITSELF WOULD CAUSE ANY AGREEMENT TO COME UNDONE, SINCE PAKISTAN IS UNLIKELY TO AGREE TO DIRECT TALKS AT THAT STAGE.

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5. THE PROCESS IS NOT LIKELY TO END IN JANUARY, HOWEVER. IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE TALKS CONTINUE. MINOR CONCESSIONS BY EACH SIDE ARE LIKELY TO KEEP THE PROCESS GOING, IF NOT TO PRODUCE AN AGREED DRAFT SETTLEMENT. CORDOVEZ AS WELL HAS AN INTEREST IN SUSTAINING THE PROCESS AS LONG AS IT SHOWS SOME PROGRESS, BOTH FOR THE UN'S PRESTIGE AND FOR HIS OWN. A COMPLETE BREAKDOWN IN JANUARY COULD FORCE HIM TO TERMINATE THE INITIATIVE, BUT

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ANYTHING SHORT OF THAT PROBABLY WOULD CONVINCE HIM TO
KEEP IT ON TRACK. THE BEST STEP MAY BE ANOTHER ROUND OF
SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY AT MID-YEAR OR ANOTHER SESSION OF
INDIRECT TALKS. BUT NO BREAKTHROUGH IS IN SIGHT. SHULTZ

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